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SUING STATE WELFARE OFFICIALS FOR DAMAGES
IN FEDERAL COURT: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Social Security Act of 19351 created categorical public
assistance programs for families with dependent children and for per-
sons who were aged, blind, or disabled. The statute provided that state
welfare officials would administer a complicated scheme of "coopera-
tive federalism '' 2 involving the federal and state regulations. Prior
to 1965, state welfare officials were seldom involved in federal litiga-
tion. s In 1964, Congress created the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) legal services program.4 Aggressive young OEO attorneys
challenged state welfare statutes and regulations in federal court on
behalf of welfare claimants. 5 State welfare officials were called upon to
explain to federal judges why welfare benefits to 16,000 dependent
children in Alabama were terminated because their mothers allegedly
entertained a man-in-the-house.6 A three-judge federal court inquired
1. The provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935, as subsequently amended,
created the categorical assistance programs commonly referred to as "welfare." Act of
Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. The categorical assistance programs for the aged, blind,
and disabled were consolidated into a single program effective January 1, 1974, called the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603,
86 Stat. 1329. State welfare officials continue to administer the program for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children [Hereinafter cited as AFDC].
2. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
3. See Barrett, The New Role of the Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law,
1970 DUKE L.J. 1; Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 84 (1967). There were also few cases in state courts involving welfare. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Heyenreich v. Lyons, 30 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1940); Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25
N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). The program provided free legal services to low
income persons through neighborhood offices. For a discussion of the formative years
of the legal services program, see E. JOHNSON, JR., JUsTICE AND REFORM (1974). For
discussion of the role of legal services attorneys in welfare litigation, see Subrin & Sutton,
Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court: A Procedural Analysis, 8 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ.
LIB. L. REv. 21 (1973); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services
for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805 (1967). The Legal Services Corporation now operates
the program pursuant to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88
Stat. 378.
5. The volume of welfare litigation has increased rapidly since 1965. The United
States Supreme Court has issued several major opinions in cases dealing with welfare
law. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598
(1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
6. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). An Alabama regulation denied AFDC
benefits to dependent children whose mothers had sexual relations with men to whom
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into the state law which denied welfare benefits to dependent children
who attended college, while dependent children who attended vocation-
al schools were granted benefits. 7 The United States Supreme Court
invalidated a Connecticut statute which denied welfare benefits to
persons who had not lived in the state a year prior to filing applica-
tions for assistance." Welfare benefits, which had been viewed as
gratituities, 9 were treated by the Supreme Court as statutory entitle-
ments requiring due process protection prior to their termination. 10
In these and other cases, federal courts invalidated state statutes
and regulations." In some cases, federal courts awarded retroactive wel-
fare benefits as a form of equitable restitution.12 But in Edelman v.
they were not married. Such men were considered "substitute fathers," regardless of
whether they owed a legal duty to support the woman's children, or did in fact
support them. The federal statute defines a "dependent child" as a "needy child . . .
who has been deprived of parental support or care .... " 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). Be-
cause of the Alabama regulation, children otherwise dependent were not considered
deprived of "parental support." Between June 1964, when the regulation became
effective, and January 1967, the number of children receiving AFDC in Alabama de-
clined by 16,000. King v. Smith, supra, at 315. For a detailed discussion of this case,
which invalidated the regulation, see Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated
to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1219 (1970). See generally
Redlich, Unconstitutional Conditions on Welfare Eligibility, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 450.
7. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). In Townsend, the United States Supreme
Court found an Illinois statute and regulation inconsistent with the Social Security Act
and therefore invalid under the supremacy clause. Accord, Carleson v. Remillard, 406
U.S. 598 (1972).
8. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Supreme Court recently upheld
a 1-year residency requirement for divorces. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 380 F.2d
632 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941).
10. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See generally Reich, The New Proper-
ty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Van Alystyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
11. Although some of the more significant Supreme Court decisions in welfare cases
were based on the due process clause, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and
the equal protection clause, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), many Su-
preme Court decisions were based on the plaintiffs' argument that state statutes and
regulations conflicted with federal regulations and the Social Security Act, and were
therefore invalid under the supremacy clause. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See generally Barrett, The New Role of the
Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1.
12. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972), afj'g,
Civil No. 70-F-46 (N.D. Ind. May 20, 1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Silvey v. Roberts, 363 F. Supp. 1006 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Story v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473
(M.D. Fla. 1972); Zarate v. State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 347 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D. Fla.), afJ'd, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.)
afJ'd per curiam sub nom., Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970). See generally Levy,
The Aftermath of Victory: The Availability of Retroactive Welfare Benefits Illegally
Denied, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 253, 285, 330 (1970).
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Jordan,13 the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that retroactive welfare benefits could be ordered as a form of equitable
restitution; the Court held that an award of retroactive benefits against
state welfare officials is barred by the eleventh amendment.1 4 The
Court reasoned that an award of retroactive benefits is akin to an
award of damages against the state. 5
This note will discuss the eleventh amendment immunity of state
welfare officials to suits for damages in federal courts and the impact
of Edelman v. Jordan upon welfare litigation. The emerging doctrine
of qualified immunity, developed by the Supreme Court in recent
cases, 16 will be discussed as a possible means of holding state welfare
officials personally liable for welfare benefits wrongfully withheld. This
note will also consider whether the practical application of this doctrine
will be of any real benefit to welfare claimants whose benefits have
been wrongfully withheld.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY OF STATE
WELFARE OFFICIALS
A. The Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment and Its
Early Interpretation
The eleventh amendment, ratified in 1798,17 was enacted in re-
sponse to the controversial decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia," which held that federal courts had
13. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
14. The U.S. CONST. amend. XI, provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.
15. 415 U.S. at 668.
16. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 420 U.S. 943 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The qualified immunity doctrine will
be examined in greater detail later in this Note.
17. For a discussion of the events surrounding the ratification of the eleventh
amendment, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972);
Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1908); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpre-
tation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207 (1968).
18. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). This action was an original bill in the United
States Supreme Court brought by the executor of the estate of a South Carolina merchant
who sold war supplies to the state of Georgia. Chisholm had presented his claim for
payment to the Georgia Legislature in 1789. After his claim was rejected, he brought
suit in the federal circuit court in 1791. After this suit was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, Chisholm filed his action in the Supreme Court. The state refused to enter
an appearance and sent a written protest to the Court, taking the position that it could
not be compelled to answer against its will. The Court asserted its judicial authority
over the states and entered a default judgment. This created an uproar which resulted in
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jurisdiction over suits against a state brought by citizens of another
state. This decision shocked the nation, largely because states feared
that their wartime creditors could sue them in federal court.1" Some
scholars argue that the ratification of the eleventh amendment restored
the original intent of the framers of the Constitution because sovereign
immunity is implicit in article III; others take the position that the
eleventh amendment reversed the original intent of the framers, ex-
pressed in article III, to abolish common law sovereign immunity.20
Although by its express terms the eleventh amendment does not
bar federal suits against a state brought by its own citizens, the Su-
preme Court rejected the position that the judicial power of the United
States extends to such suits. 21 In Hans v. Louisiana,2 2 the plaintiff
sued to recover the amount of coupons on bonds issued by the state.
The Court did not clarify23 why the eleventh amendment barred
the ratification of the eleventh amendment 5 years later. Prior to the Chisholm decision,
suits had been brought against Maryland in Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
401 (1791) and against New York in Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792),
by persons who were not citizens of those states. Immediately after the decision, a number
of suits were filed against states in federal courts by persons who were not citizens of
the states. See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L.
REV. 207, 224 n.66, 228 n.78, 228-29 n.81 (1968).
19. See Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1908), Comment, Private Suits Against States in the
Federal Courts, 33 U. Cni. L. REV. 331 (1966).
20. For a discussion of common law sovereign immunity in England and colonial
America, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAsv.
L. REV. 1 (1963). The doctrine of sovereign immunity was firmly imbedded in English
common law before the settlement of the American colonies. Although it was said "the
King can do no wrong," in practice this did not mean that the King was completely
above the law. See Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 189-95 (1908); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment:
Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207, 207-10 (1968). Although the King's
permission was necessary to sue in his courts, apparently this permission, in the form
of various writs, was given as a matter of course. Since those who wrote the United
States Constitution were students of the English legal system, scholars have puzzled over
the question of whether article III is implicitly limited by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity which existed at the time of its drafting, or whether article III in effect repeals
common law statutory immunity. See, C. JACOBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3-26 (1972).
21. The welfare cases with which this note is concerned involve citizens of a state
suing their own state welfare officials.
22. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
23. See Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Cm. L. REV.
331 (1966). Some commentators have criticized the Hans decision for its failure to explain
how the Court reached this result given the express language of the amendment. See, e.g.,
Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NorRE
DAME LAW. 496, 497-98 (1975). One commentator believes the Hans decision was based
on common law sovereign immunity, rather than constitutional immunity as some courts
have concluded. See Comment, 7 GA. L. REV. 366, 369 n.21 (1973). Nevertheless, the
federal courts have consistently applied the Hans principle. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,
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suits brought against an unconsenting state24  by its citizens, but
nevertheless held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over such
suits.2 5 Had the Court held otherwise, citizens of a state would have
a federal remedy against the state which citizens of other states and
aliens would not have because of the express terms of the eleventh
amendment.
2 6
The eleventh amendment was originally interpreted by the Supreme
Court to apply only to suits in which the state was a nominal party. 27
The Court rejected this position 4 years later,2 8 holding that when
a suit is brought against the chief state officer in his official capacity
the state should be considered a party on the record.2 9 Later cases ex-
tended this principle to "look behind and through the nominal parties
on the record, to ascertain who were the real parties to the suit."30
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), and the cases cited therein. The basis for the Hans decision is
crucial when the possibility of a waiver of immunity exists. If states are constitutionally
immune from suit in federal court by their own citizens, waiver will have to meet
a higher standard than if there is a waiver of common law immunity. See note 24 infra.
24. Eleventh amendment immunity is considered a jurisdictional bar. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974). Generally, federal courts have held that parties may
not consent to jurisdiction in the absence of constitutionally created judicial power.
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902). In the area of eleventh amendment im-
munity, however, the principle that a state may consent to suit and waive its immunity
has long been recognized. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906);
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 256 (1837); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). The principle that the state can waive its eleventh amendment im-
munity is based in part on the theory that sovereign immunity is implicit in article
III. Since, historically, the King could consent to suit, the state may do likewise. See
generally C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3-26 (1972).
This raises the question of whether consent must be expressed or implied. In three
cases in the 1940's, the Court held that consent must be clearly expressed. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
In these cases, the Court held that suits to recover taxes allegedly wrongfully withheld
were barred by the eleventh amendment. In later cases, the Supreme Court relaxed the
standard and adopted the view that a state could waive its eleventh amendment im-
munity by implication. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377
U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). In
1973, the Court retreated from the Paiden position in Employees v. Public Health Dep't,
411 U.S. 279 (1973). In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court returned to
the standard first announced in Ford Motor Co., that any waiver of immunity must be
"by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Id. at 673.
25. 134 U.S. at 18 (1890).
26. This was one of the reasons Mr. Justice Bradley gave to support the Hans
decision. 134 U.S. at 10 (1890).
27. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824); accord, Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872).
28. Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 110 (1828).
29. Id. at 122.
30. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor
1976]
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Federal courts have concluded that if a state is not named in a suit but
state funds will be used to pay a judgment, the suit is against the state
and barred by the eleventh amendment.31
But even if it is determined that a suit is against the state, the
judicially created doctrine of Ex parte Young 32 allows suits by private
citizens seeking injunctive relief against state officers . 3 Since a private
individual could not sue the state in federal court without running
afoul of the eleventh amendment, the Supreme Court created the
fiction3 4 that a state officer, when seeking to enforce an allegedly un-
constitutional statute, is "stripped of his official or representative
character"3 5 and no longer entitled to the protection of the state for
purposes of the eleventh amendment. Although the doctrine of Ex
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47 (1944). In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 490 (1887).
31. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), the Court
stated:
"[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.
32. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For discussion of this landmark case, see Davis, Suing the
Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1962);
Comment, Federal Injunctions Against State Actions, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 744 (1967).
See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 48, at 183-86 (2d ed. 1970).
33. The holding of Ex parte Young was that the eleventh amendment did not bar
an action in federal court which sought to enjoin the attorney general of Minnesota
from enforcing a statute which allegedly violated the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. An action had been brought by the shareholders of nine
railroads to enjoin enforcement of a statute which reduced railroad rates to a level
plaintiffs regarded as confiscatory.
34. The logical inconsistencies of this fiction have provoked comment. See, e.g.,
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1975), in which
the court referred to the doctrine of Ex parte Young as occupying a "peculiar niche in
our jurisprudence." Id. at 746. The Harkless court stated:
This Court will not pause here to elaborate on the logical inconsistencies inherent
in the fiction of Ex parte Young. Its doctrine has fairly been termed "indispensible
to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." It is a
firm part of our jurisprudence.
388 F. Supp. at 747 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Davis illustrated the logical applications of the Ex parte Young doctrine
in his tongue-in-cheek article, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an
Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1962). He pointed out:
When you sue the government for an injunction or a declaratory judgment, you
must falsely pretend (in absence of special statute) that the suit is not against
the government but that it is against an officer. You may get relief against the
sovereign if, but only if, you falsely pretend that you are not asking for relief
against the sovereign. The judges often will falsely pretend that they are not
giving you relief against the sovereign, even though you know and they know,
and they know that you know, that the relief is against the sovereign. Even when
the substance of sovereign immunity is gone, the form usually remains.
Id. at 435.
35. 209 U.S. at 160 (1908).
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parte Young has never been extended to allow suits against state officials
for damages, money judgments against the state in the form of equitable
relief have been awarded by some federal courts38 prior to the Edelman
decision.
B. Retroactive Welfare Benefits as Damages: Edelman v. Jordan
In several cases in which federal courts granted retroactive welfare
benefits, the eleventh amendment issue received scant attention, 37 or
was rejected as a defense with little discussion.3 8 Several courts denied
retroactive welfare benefits on the grounds that such an award would
be in effect a money judgment against the state and therefore barred
by the eleventh amendment.3 9 In Rothstein v. Wyman,40 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a New York
regulation which provided varying amounts of welfare benefits for
different geographical areas of the state.41 The court issued an injunc-
tion against the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services to
prevent enforcement of the regulation, but held that it lacked juris-
diction to enter an award of retroactive welfare benefits.4 2 The Roth-
stein court pointed out:
36. See note 12 supra.
37. Four three-judge court decisions requiring state welfare officials to pay retro-
active welfare benefits from the state treasury were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Three of the affirmances were summary. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organiza-
tion, 409 U.S. 809 (1972), aff'g unreported order and judgment of N.D. Ind. 1972; State
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972), aff'g 347 F.
Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), afl'g Gaddis v. Wyman,
304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In the fourth decision, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court did not comment on the issue, although it was
raised in the district court proceedings. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338
n.5 (D. Conn. 1967).
38. See, e.g., Silvey v. Roberts, 363 F. Supp. 1006, 1013-14 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Story v.
Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473, 476-77 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
39. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973);
Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970).
40. 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972). See Comment, 26 VAND. L. REv. 633 (1973).
41. The district in which New York City was located provided maximum pay-
ments of $208 for a family of four, while the surrounding seven-county area provided
maximum payments of $183. 467 F.2d at 229.
42. The Rothstein court could have followed traditional equity principles and held
that equitable relief was inappropriate in that particular fact situation without reaching
the constitutional issue. Although the court stated that "we do not consider it an
appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction for the District Court to compel
New York to devote its funds to retroactive payments." 467 F.2d at 241. It went on to
reach the constitutional issue:
[E]ven if the action taken by the District Court [awarding retroactive benefits] be
deemed to be in keeping with the framework of federal-state relationships in the
case of grants-in-aid for welfare programs, the Eleventh Amendment stands in
the way.
1976]
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It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the
personal resources of appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate
that they will, rather, involve substantial expenditures from the
public funds of the state. It is equally a part of the lore of the
Eleventh Amendment that, even though a state may not be named
as a party defendant, any judgment declaring a liability which
must be met from the public funds of the state does come within the
reach of the Eleventh Amendment; and a court will, absent the state's
consent, be deemed without jurisdiction to enter such a judgment.4 3
The Rothstein court rejected the contention that the doctrine of
Ex parte Young had completely stripped the state welfare official of
his immunity; it distinguished that principle in the following language:
The doctrine of Ex parte Young had made it possible for suits to
be brought in federal courts against state welfare officials without im-
pingement on the Eleventh Amendment, but the available remedies
against them do not exceed the scope of Ex parte Young and, in
particular, they do not comprehend judgments involving the payment
of money which are intended to be-and which can only be-liquidat-
ed by the expenditure of state funds.4 4
The Rothstein court also rejected the contention that the state
had waived its eleventh amendment immunity by participating in the
federal-state welfare program.4 5 Relinquishment of a constitutional
right must be clear and unequivocal; the mere fact of participation in
the welfare program could not be considered a clear and unequivocal
waiver of the eleventh amendment immunity by the state.4"
Id. After balancing the interest of the plaintiffs in receiving retroactive welfare benefits
with the defendant's interests in protecting the state treasury, the court concluded that
an award of retroactive benefits would have a disruptive effect on the state treasury and
the administration of the welfare program. Further, the court stated:
[W]e cannot be sure that the persons from whom funds were withheld in 1969 have
a present compelling need for them, or that it is provident, given existing depriva-
tions which might be relieved, to order the expenditures of scarce funds as
compensation for past suffering which, however deplorable, cannot be undone.
Id. at 234. One commentator has criticized the court for its assumption that once
deprived, a person no longer suffers the consequences of the deprivation:
The court completely missed the point as to what real effects the withholding of
funds (due retroactively or otherwise) will have on an indigent person. For instance,
it can mean the loss of health, dignity, or sense of worthiness as well as inadequate
food, housing, and clothing.
Comment, 7 GA. L. REV. 386-87 n.108 (1973).
43. 467 F.2d at 236.
44. Id. at 238.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, faced
with the issue of whether the eleventh amendment barred an award of
retroactive welfare benefits, reached the opposite conclusion in
Jordan v. Weaver.4 7 The court held invalid an Illinois regulation which
allowed the Illinois Department of Public Aid to delay processing
welfare applications beyond the time allowed by federal regulation.48
The Jordan court upheld the district court's award of retroactive bene-
fits, 4 9 and criticized-° the Rothstein court for limiting the doctrine of
Ex parte Young. It argued "the teaching of Ex parte Young is not that
a prospective injunction only may issue, but that, where appropriate
to deal with defiance of federal law, a federal court's equitable inter-
vention may take an effective form."'' 1
The Jordan court also criticized the Rothstein court's emphasis
upon the fact that the judgment would affect the state treasury. That
a judgment must be met from the state's funds, "is not the touchstone
of the Eleventh Amendment's applicability,' '5 2 because, the court
pointed out, public funds must also be spent to comply with the terms
of an injunction allowed by the doctrine of Ex parte Young.53 The
Jordan court also refused to characterize retroactive welfare benefits
as damages, insisting that such an award was an integral part of equit-
able restitution by which the "defendant is made to disgorge ill-gotten
gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both objectives. '"5 4
47. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973). See Comment, 7 GA. L. REv.
366 (1973); Comment, 21 KAN. L. REv. 429 (1973).
48. Plaintiff Jordan, a mentally retarded 61-year-old man, had an application pend-
ing for disability benefits for almost four months. The federal regulations required a
decision within 60 days. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 654 n.3 (1974). Defendant Weaver was the Director of the Illinois Department of
Public Aid.
49. 472 F.2d at 993. The court declined to review the appropriatenes of the award
of retroactive relief because "defendants did not pointedly bring out below countervailing
considerations that might make the district court's relief an improper exercise of
equitable discretion." Id. at 993 n.14.
50. The court stated: "We recognize the Second Circuit came to a contrary conclu-
sion in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), but are unpersuaded by its
reasoning." Id. at 990 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 991.
52. Id.
53. Id. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970); Griffin v. County School Bd. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
54. 472 F.2d at 994, quoting Professor Moore. The court stated that restitution
differs from damages and penalties; it cited Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395 (1946), as its authority. 472 F.2d at 993. The court also stated that plaintiffs were
not seeking consequential damages. "Rather, incident to the injunctive relief prayed
for, they asked that exactly measured benefits retained by defendants which would have
been paid out but for a violation of the federal law be paid over to them." 472 F.2d
at 993.
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The court was fearful of the "spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly,
defying federal law" 55 unless retroactive benefits were granted; it
warned:
Otherwise a state could engage in practices which would deny eligible
recipients the full measure of that assistance which Congress has in-
tended for them "at the minimal risk of a subsequent finding of un-
constitutionality [or illegality] (if indeed it is challenged) which
finding would come only some time later after the case had gone
the judicial route and which would deny retroactive relief thus
giving the state the desired effect and savings at least during the
period of [their] existence." 56
Unlike the Rothstein court, the Jordan court found that the state
had waived whatever immunity it may have had by participating in
the state-federal welfare program. 7 The Jordan and Rothstein decisions
also conflicted over the question of whether the doctrine of Ex parte
Young establishes federal jurisdiction over suits seeking retroactive
welfare benefits. To resolve the conflict, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari58 in the Jordan case sub nom., Edelman v.
Jordan.59
By a 5-to-4 vote, 60 the Supreme Court reversed that portion of
the judgment of the Jordan court which awarded retroactive benefits.61
The Court concluded that the eleventh amendment bars an award of
retroactive benefits since "it is in practical effect indistinguishable in
many aspects from an award of damages against the state."62 Because
the "funds will obviously not be paid out of the pocket of petitioner
Edelman,"' 6 3 the Court observed that the funds:
55. 472 F.2d at 995.
56. Id., quoting Alexander v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666, 673 (N.D. I11. 1973).
57. The court stated:
We cannot conceive that Illinois could legitimately expect to be able to participate
in the federal program, receive federal funds in consideration for its agreement
to channel them, together with state funds, to beneficaries in compliance with
federal law, and then be able to violate that law and invariably retain the
savings accruing through that illegality.
Id.
58. 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
59. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For discussion of the significance of this case, see Note,
Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE DAMF
LAW. 496 (1975); Comment, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 144 (1974).
60. The majority consisted of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, White, and
Powell. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
61. 415 U.S. 651, 659.
62. Id. at 668.
63. Id. at 664.
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[m]ust inevitably come from the general revenues of the State of
Illinois, and thus the award resembles far more closely the monetary
award against the State itself, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, supra, than it does the prospective injunctive relief award-
ed in Ex parte Young. 4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that a literal
reading of the eleventh amendment does not bar suits for damages
against a state brought by citizens of the same state.65 But it relied on
the Hans doctrine6 6 to extend eleventh amendment immunity to Edel-
man in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of
Public Aid. After this determination, the Court found that the State
of Illinois though not a named party to the suit, was a real party in
interest.
[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from
the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is en-
titled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though in-
dividual officials are nominal defendants.67
The Court also rejected the court of appeals' position that the
doctrine of Ex parte Young allowed an award of retroactive benefits as
a form of equitable relief. The Court limited the holding of Ex parte
Young to prospective equitable relief. It stated:
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this court
to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state
officer, no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money
judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may
be labeled "equitable" in nature. The Court's opinion in Ex parte
Young hewed to no such line.6
The Court acknowledged that prospective equitable relief often
has a significant effect on the state treasury, 69 but held that "[s]uch an
ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an in-
evitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young
70
64. Id. at 665.
65. Id. at 662-63.
66. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
67. 415 U.S. at 663, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.
459, 464 (1945).
68. 415 U.S. at 666.
69. Id. at 667-68.
70. Id. at 668.
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The Edelman decision was criticized by one commentator as rest-
ing on "ambigiuous, doubtful precedent and tenuous reasoning."71
Nevertheless, it had immediate repercussions. In Owens v. Roberts,
72
a three judge panel in the Middle District of Florida was forced to
withdraw the portion of its order which granted retroactive welfare
benefits. Welfare claimants Owens and Worth had been denied
benefits pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.7 3 After Edelman, the
Owens court ruled that only prospective declaratory and injunctive re-
lief was available. And since the federal government took over the
operation of the programs under which Owens and Worth were
eligible, 74 that relief was of no direct benefit to them. Another retro-
active welfare benefit case pending before the same court of appeals
which had decided Edelman, sub nom., Jordan v. Weaver, was reversed
after the Edelman decision. In Wilson v. Weaver, the court which had
heard oral argument before Edelman, reversed the district court's
award of retroactive benefits.7 5 When faced with the identical situation,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded Mil-
burn v. Huecker7 6 for consideration in light of Edelman. In Thompson
v. Madison County Board of Education,7 7 an appeal was pending at the
time of the Edelman decision. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for findings on
the eleventh amendment issue, since neither of the parties had an op-
portunity to brief or argue it. Finally, in an action for back wages
brought by Connecticut state troopers, the United States Court of
71. Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 496, 506 (1975).
72. 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
73. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-268 (§ 409.185(l)(b), and the Division of Family Service
regulations promulgated thereunder created an rebuttable presumption that any person
transferring property worth more than $600 for less than its assessed value had made the
transfer with intent to defraud the welfare authorities. The named plaintiffs and mem-
bers of their class were absolutely foreclosed from receiving benefits to which they were
otherwise entitled for 2 years from the date of the transfer. Plaintiff Owens, an 85-
year-old woman, had sold her home for $1,050 (although its assessed value was $2,885)
to pay her husband's burial expenses. Plaintiff Worth, a 54-year-old woman with only one
kidney who suffered from arthritis, an ulcer, an infected liver, and gallbladder disease,
sold used beauty parlor equipment assessed at $660 for $200 after her doctor had
advised her to discontinue operating her beauty parlor. A three-judge court found
the statute and regulation inconsistent with the Social Security Act and therefore
invalid under the supremacy clause. 377 F. Supp. at 54. The court also found that
the regulation violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 51-54.
74. See note 1 supra.
75. Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974).
76. Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974).
77. 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that since the troopers' argu-
ment "was destroyed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Edel-
man v. Jordan .... [T]here is no need to investigate further the merits
of the case presented. '" 78
Beyond this immediate impact,7 9 it is difficult to determine whether
Justice Marshall's dire prediction, made in his dissent in Edelman,
will come true. Justice Marshall Stated:
Absent any remedy which may act with retroactive effect, state
welfare officials have everything to gain and nothing to lose by fail-
ing to comply with the congressional mandate that assistance be paid
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.80
Regardless of the logical inconsistencies8' of Edelman, it is certain
that attorneys for welfare claimants will be forced to face the decision
in the future. One commentator has suggested several alternatives for
avoiding the results of Edelman, although none appears feasible.8 2
It is not likely that the Court will overrule its decision, or that the
eleventh amendment will be repealed, or that the Court will limit
the holding to the facts of the case, given the broadly worded opinion.
As one commentator stated:
78. Wilkerson v. Meskill, 501 F.2d 297, 298 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. See also Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Harder, 383
F. Supp. 174 (D. Conn. 1974); Burrell v. Norton, 381 F. Supp. 339 (D. Conn. 1974); Clif-
ton v. Grisham, 381 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Taylor v. Hill, 377 F. Supp. 495
(W.D.N.C. 1974); Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430 (D. Alas. 1974); Borror v. White, 377
F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Va. 1974). The effect of Edelman can also be seen in cases dealing
with awards of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974);
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226 (D.P.R. 1974); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruin-
ing the Environment v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Some courts have also
held that an award of back pay may be barred by the eleventh amendment as interpreted
in Edelman. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, No. 74-2581 (2d Cir. 1975); Murgia v. Board of
Retirement, 386 F. Supp. 179 (D. Mass. 1974). See McGee, Employment Discrimination
and the Eleventh Amendment: The Impact of Edelman v. Jordan on Title VII Practice,
9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 235 (Aug. 1975). A novel concept which appears to avoid the
eleventh amendment issue is an award of "front pay" in which successful plaintiffs are
paid a larger salary in the future to which they might not otherwise be entitled, as a
form of restitution. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D.
Ala. 1973).
80. 415 U.S. at 692 (1974).
81. As one commentator who has criticized the Court's decision stated:
"[T]he failure of the Court should not be ascribed to its present members. The
entire history of the eleventh amendment has been and remains ambiguous and
uncertain; the Edelman opinion is merely a product of that history."
Note, Edelman v. Jordan: A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 496, 506 (1975).
82. Id. at 504-506.
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The inevitable conclusion is that Edelman, in contrast to the eleventh
amendment itself, means exactly what it says, that the states cannot
be compelled by federal courts to compensate those who federal
rights they violate.83
III. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND SECTION 1983: THE
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF STATE WELFARE OFFICIALS FOR WRONGFULLY
WITHHELD BENEFITS
A. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine: Scheuer v. Rhodes
Since it has been established that retroactive welfare benefits will
be treated as damages for purposes of the eleventh amendment, it is
clear that welfare claimants cannot recover wrongfully withheld bene-
fits from the state treasury. But because the eleventh amendment re-
lates only to a state welfare official's liability in his or her official capaci-
ty, it is appropriate to consider separately the official's personal liabili-
ty.8 4 Under section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code, an individual
has a cause of action against every person85 who, acting under color
of state law,6 subjects the individual to the deprivation of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."8 7 Al-
though this statute is not jurisdictional, welfare claimants have used
subsections 1343(3) and (4) of Title 28, United States Code, as a juris-
dictional basis for actions against state welfare officials.8s Section 1983 is
83. id. at 507.
84. See generally Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Con-
duct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REV. 548 (1972); Note,
The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HAsv. L. REV.
1229 (1955).
85. The effect of § 1983 has been limited by judicial decisions which narrowly
define the term "person." E.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity Under
the Civil Rights Act-Closing the Loopholes, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1289 (1974).
86. This phrase has been liberally construed. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1971); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper procedure for redress.
The protected rights are principally due process rights, equal protection rights, rights
created by federal statutes, and rights owing their existence to federal functions. See
generally C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs (1971).
88. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4) (1970) provide:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
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broadly phrased to impose liability for damages on "every person" who
deprives an individual of rights secured by the Constitution and federal
laws. Federal courts, however, have held that actions under section
1983 are limited by common law immunity. 9 It is only by overcoming
the hurdle of common law immunity that the welfare claimant can
recover damages against an individual state welfare official.90
Historically, members of the legislature91 and judicial officers92
have been absolutely immune from suit. The doctrine of official im-
munity for executive officials was not a part of this common law tradi-
tion, except for the immunity of the Chief Executive.9 3 The concept
of immunity for state executive officials did not arise in this country
until the nineteenth century; 94 it was justified on the grounds that
it would be unfair for an official to be liable for performing a manda-
tory duty.95 Because high state officials regularly engaged in policy de-
cisions, it was thought that subjecting them to liability would be a
deterrent to effective performance of their discretionary functionsY6
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
89. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951). Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Pierson, stated: "The legis-
lative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities." 386 U.S. at 554.
90. See generally Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Con-
duct: The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548 (1972); Com-
ment, 53 N.C.L. REv. 439 (1974).
91. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). According to Justice Frankfurter,
"The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do
or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Id. at 372.
92. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). As Chief Justice Warren pointed out:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdic-
tion, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. 335 ... (1872).
386 U.S. at 553-54. Officers such as prosecutors and grand jurors are also protected by
common law immunity when engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See, e.g.,
Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
93. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1886).
94. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); accord, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959).
95. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1295 n.54 (1953).
96. See generally Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct:
The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548 (1972).
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Although the distinction between discretionary and ministerial or
mandatory functions appears simple, in practice federal courts have
not been able to agree on which function is being performed in
various fact situations. 9 Additionally, it has been thought improper to
require state officials to defend themselves in protracted and expensive
litigation, for as Judge Learned Hand pointed out:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most ir-
responsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.9
On the other hand, the public also has an interest in obtaining
redress for the wrongful acts of state officials.99 Thus, although judges
and legislators have absolute common law immunity, it has been extend-
ed in only qualified form to state executive officials. 00 One reason for
the failure to extend broad immunity to state officials is the public's
interest in holding state officials liable for their wrongful acts. In cases
arising under section 1983, the threshold question is whether a state
official, acting under color of state law, has deprived an individual
of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Federal courts
have recognized the conflict between extending common law immunity
to state officials and the desirability of liberally construing the civil
rights acts. 10 1 As one commentator concluded: "Although unlimited
97. Professor Jaffe summarized the distinction between ministerial and discretionary
functions as follows:
It has for some time been traditional to say that an officer is not liable if he is
exercising "discretionary" power. As the principle is applied, if the officer acts
in an area where customarily he has discretion-that is, has a power and duty to
make a choice among valid alternatives-he is not held liable in damages even
though in the case at hand he made a choice that was beyond his power, or in-
deed had no valid choice open to him at all. . . . However, if the officer has
no discretion-if rather his duties are "ministerial"-he is held liable for failure
to perform them.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damages Actions, 77 HAsv. L. REV. 209,
218 (1963).
98. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
99. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241
(1974), "the public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the pro-
tection of the public." This quotation can be interpreted either to mean that the
public interest requires officials to obey the law, or that state officials should not be
hampered in their enforcement of the law by fear of personal liability for performing
discretionary acts.
100. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
101. See, e.g., Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); Robichaud v. Ronan,
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liability may be unwise, absolute immunity would be equally unde-
sirable, for it would virtually deprive the Acts of all meaning insofar
as they provide an action at law against state officials.' 1 2 Similarly,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
[T]he purpose of § 1983 as well as the other Civil Rights provisions
is to provide a federal remedy for the deprivation of federally
guaranteed rights in order to enforce more perfectly federal limita-
tions on unconstitutional state action. To hold all state officers im-
mune from suit would very largely frustrate the salutary purpose
of this provision. We conclude the defense of official immunity should
be applied sparingly in suits brought under § 1983.103
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the
validity of the qualified immunity doctrine in Scheuer v. Rhodes,10 4
and provided guidelines for its application in a suit for damages against
state officials. In Scheuer, suits were brought on behalf of students killed
at Kent State University in May 1970, when Ohio National Guardsmen
fired into a crowd. 0 5 The defendants, sued in their individual and
official capacities, were the Governor of Ohio, officials of the Ohio Na-
tional Guard, unnamed guardsmen, and the president of the universi-
ty. The complaint alleged that defendants willfully caused an unneces-
sary guard deployment and ordered illegal actions which resulted in
the students' deaths. 06 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio dismissed the suit, holding that because
the action was one for damages against the state, it was barred by the
eleventh amendment. 0 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed. 0 8 The court of appeals held, in addition, that
an unqualified immunity protected the defendants. 09 On appeal, the
351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Hoffman v.
Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959).
102. Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1298
(1953).
103. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1966); accord, McLaughlin v.
Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968).
104. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
105. See generally J. %ICI-IENER, KENT STATE: VIHAT HAPPENED AND WiH' (1971). See
also NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1971, at 28-30.
106. Defendants were sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for allegedly depriving
plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution.
107. Three suits were filed in the Northern District of Ohio on behalf of students
killed at Kent State University. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, Civil No. 70-859; Krause v.
Rhodes, Civil No. 70-544; Miller v. Rhodes, Civil No. 70-816, all noted in Verkuil, supra
note 84, at 552 n.17, 554 n.25.
108. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
109. Id. at 442.
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United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to allow
plaintiffs to offer evidence in support of their claims against the de-
fendants as individuals. 110
The Scheuer court rejected the holding of the court of appeals that
the action was barred by the eleventh amendment. Because plaintiffs
alleged facts that indicated they were seeking to impose personal
liability upon the defendants, the Court concluded that the suit was
not against the state; therefore, the eleventh amendment did not
apply." : Relying on the doctrine of Ex parte Young, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, concluded that when a state officer act-
ing under a state law violates the federal constitution, the officer
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution,
and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from his responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States." 2
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Edelman view that the doctrine
of Ex parte Young does not allow a plaintiff to seek damages from the
public treasury. 1 3 The Court pointed out, however, that damages
against private individuals may be a "permissible remedy in some
circumstances notwithstanding the fact that [those individuals] hold
public office. '"" 4
Having overcome the hurdle of the eleventh amendment by seeking
to hold state officials personally liable, the plaintiffs in Scheuer faced
the barrier of common law official immunity. The court of appeals
held that the defendants, as state officials, were absolutely immune
from suits for damages; 15 the Supreme Court, after reviewing the his-
tory of common law immunity, rejected this view?16 The Court
balanced the interest of the public in obtaining redress for state
officials' wrongful acts against the interest of the public in vigorous and
effective exercise of discretion by state officials. The Court concluded
that state officials were not absolutely immune from suits for damages.117
110. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
111. Id. at 238.
112. Id. at 237, quoting from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
113. 416 U.S. at 238.
114. Id. As authority, the Court cited: Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
115. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 442 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
116. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974).
117. Id. at 247.
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In addition, the Court developed standards to be used to determine
whether a public official"1 8 may be held personally liable for wrongful
acts:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reason-
able grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in
the course of official conduct. 1 9
In developing the qualified immunity test, the Court apparently
rejected the traditional discretionary-ministerial functions distinc-
tion.1 2 0 Rather than examine the nature of the duties performed by the
state official to see if they were ministerial or discretionary, the Court
seemed to adopt the subjective "good faith" and objective "reasonable-
ness" standards of Pierson v. Ray. 1 These standards are to be applied
even to discretionary acts of state executive officials, although the scope
of discretion will be considered in determining liability. 22
B. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine Applied to State
Welfare Officials
In applying the Scheuer qualified immunity test to welfare cases,
welfare claimants will have difficulty in proving that a state welfare
official's wrongful acts resulted from bad faith and were unreasonable
under the circumstances. First, state welfare officials are not likely to
be involved in day-to-day contact with clients. Therefore, it would be
difficult to show that the official exhibited personal malice towards
welfare claimants. Second, since state and federal welfare law changes
rapidly, it is not likely that welfare claimants could prove that a state
welfare official knowingly violated their rights."2 State welfare officials,
118. The doctrine of qualified immunity applies not only to state officials, but to
federal officials. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Lewis v.
Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
119. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
120. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
77 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1963).
121. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
122. See Note, The Federal Rules of Evidence and Florida Evidence Law Compared,
3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 384, 388 n.24 (1975).
123. Even in an area which appears to be settled, once a particular statute or regu-
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like the police officers in Pierson v. Ray, 124 are "not charged with pre-
dicting the future course of constitutional law."1 25 But in circumstances
such as those confronting the Court in Edelman'2 6 it might be possible
to show that Edelman's failure to require his employees to process wel-
fare applications within the time prescribed by federal regulations was
evidence of bad faith. It is difficult to see how Edelman could argue
that he reasonably believed such a delay was proper in the face of
explicit federal guidelines to the contrary. Since Edelman himself was
not directly involved in processing welfare applications, he might have
argued that any delays were the result of inadequate staffing due to
a shortage of funds, and not a result of bad faith. On the other
hand, in a situation such as that confronting the court in Owens v.
Roberts,12 7 application of the Scheuer doctrine is more difficult. In
Owens, a Florida statute and regulation were held invalid as incon-
sistent with the Social Security Act,"1s and violative of due process and
equal protection. 12 9 The statute and regulation1 3 0  created an Jr-
rebuttable presumption'3 ' that the transfer of property worth more
than $600 for less than its assessed value within 2 years prior to or
during the receipt of assistance, was made with intent to defraud the
welfare authorities. Had plaintiffs sought to impose personal liability
against the defendant state welfare official, the official could have argued
that he reasonably believed that the statute and regulation were valid,
since almost every other state had such provisions. 3 2
One element which affects the performance of both mandatory and
discretionary acts by state welfare officials is the political climate in
the nation and the particular state. It is common knowledge that there
are abuses and inefficiencies in the welfare system; state government
lation has been declared unconstitutional, a state may try to regulate the same conduct
by enacting another statute or regulation. Compare King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968),
with Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975), and Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
124. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
125. Id. at 557.
126. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
127. 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
128. Id. at 55.
129. Id. at 51-54.
130. See note 75 supra.
131. The fate of the statutory presumption argument presented in Owens is un-
certain after the Supreme Court's decision in Veinburger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
132. Prior to the federal administrative takeover of OAA and APTD, 39 states
had statutes similar to Florida's which restricted eligibility if claimants had transferred
property under certain circumstances prior to or during receipt of assistance. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 49, § 17(14) (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-252 (1956); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 99-603 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3-1.3 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1251
(a)-I (1933).
SUING STATE WELFARE OFFICIALS
officials and citizens are often hostile to welfare programs.15s The wel-
fare system, especially in times of inflation, is often a target for budget
cuts and other restrictions. A state welfare official who wants to change
a constitutionally defective policy may be faced with an inadequate
staff and lack of resources to implement changes; a state welfare official
who supports constitutionally defective policies can obstruct changes
in policy by pointing to fiscal problems.
In an obvious violation of settled welfare law, it is possible that a
state welfare official could be held personally liable for wrongfully
withheld welfare benefits. The Supreme Court has indicated its willing-
ness to apply the Scheuer qualified immunity doctrine,'5 4 and it is likely
that federal courts will flesh out the doctrine in the future.13 5 The Su-
preme Court may, however, be sidestepping the major issue. For even
though it is theoretically possible to hold state welfare officials personal-
ly liable, the officials will probably be judgment proof, unless the
state provides insurance.136
An attempt to avoid the effect of the eleventh amendment by using
the Scheuer theory may prove little more than a provocative but ulti-
mately futile intellectual exercise for attorneys. For their welfare
clients, it could mean the loss of food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care which they would have received but for the operation of an un-
constitutional state statute or regulation. That is the price that must
be paid for the continued legislative and judicial obeisance to the
eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.
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133. See, e.g., Crackdown on Welfare Begins to Take Hold, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Feb. 19, 1973, at 37-40; How Welfare Keeps Women from Working, Bus. WEEK,
Apr. 7, 1973, at 51; New York Times, July 1, 1975, at 15, col. I.
134. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (section 1983 suit for
damages against staff of Florida state mental hospital for failure to provide treatment
or release patient); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (section 1983 suit seeking
damages against school district officials for failing to provide a hearing prior to expul-
sion of students from high school).
135. A number of lower federal courts have considered the Scheuer doctrine of
qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974); Oppenheimer
Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F. Supp. 326 (D.P.R. 1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975);
Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1974); James
v. Wallace, 386 F. Supp. 815 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Black Bros. Combined v. City of Rich-
mond, 386 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Va. 1974); Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp.
718 (D. Del. 1974); Gettleman v. Werner, 377 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
136. Some states provide personal liability insurance for state officials. See Note, The
Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1232
(1955); Comment, 53 N.C.L. REV. 439, 446 (1974). Although funds for the insurance policies
come from the state treasury, judgments for damages would be payable through the
insurance company, and not directly from the state treasury.
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